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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
: 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 870094 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for 
Aggravated Robbery, a first-degree felony and for being an 
habitual criminal, a first-degree felony, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honrable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-
(3)(h) and Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(b)(1) (1953, as amended) 
whereby a defendant in a criminal action may take an appeal to 
the Supreme Court from a final judgment of conviction of a first-
degree felony. 
STATEMENT Qf THE CftSE 
Steven Stilling (hereafter "defendant) was convicted by 
a jury of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. S§ 76-6-302 (1953, as amended); and being an 
Habitual Criminal in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 
(1953, as amended). The court sentenced the Defendant to two 
concurrent sentences of five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This fact situation that underlies this case is 
complex. At the end of this Statement of Facts is a chronology 
of events for the Court's reference. 
On March 10, 1984, a man matching the description of 
Steven Michael Stilling robbed Self's Foodland (hereafter 
"Self's") in Salt Lake City armed with a gun. The robber found 
the store manager, John Thomas, in the back room of the store, 
threatened the manager with the gun, and had the manager empty 
the safe and the checkstands (R. 839). The manager complied with 
the robber's demands by walking with him to the front of the 
store and emptying the safe, and instructing the two women 
operating the checkstands to empty their tills (R. 839-844). Mr. 
Thomas was able to see the defendant well enough to pick the 
defendant out of a photo lineup given four weeks after the 
robbery (R. 880), and made a positive in-court identification 
both at preliminary hearing (R. 857) and at trial (R. 848). 
Three other witnesses—the two cashiers at Self's that night 
(Stacey Lee Roberts, R. 904-915, and Wendy Sheldon, R. 942-970) 
and a customer at the store (Dennis Wall, R. 970-980)—also saw 
the robber. 
Cashier Stacey Lee Roberts testified that she saw the 
robber for "Iplrobably about a minute. Maybe two" (R. 911-13), 
and gave a general corroborating description of the robber as 
being a white male, 5'10" tall, of average weight, wearing a dark 
jacket, and having dark, "not very long" hair (R. 911-13)• 
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Cashier Wendy Sheldon gave a more detailed 
corroborative description of the robber as being a white male, 
tall and "kind of slender", with brown hair, wearing a brown 
leather jacket, jeans, green and white tennis shoes (R. 947-48). 
She also made an in-court identification of the defendant as 
being someone who "looks like the person" who robbed Selffs that 
night (R. 949), calling her ID "70%" certain (R. 951). 
Customer Dennis Wall saw the robber twice—once in the 
store and once when the robber came out to Wall's car and spoke 
to him. Wall had noticed, prior to buying his groceries, that he 
had not brought his checkbook. Wall then searched his car, and 
when he could not find his checkbook there, he went back in and 
informed a cashier that he would have to go home to get his 
checkbook. At that time, he noticed the robber by the 
checkstand. Then 
the gentleman that was standing at the end of 
the checkstand walked—I just sat down in the 
car. The car door was open, and he walked 
by, and he said to me, that cashier wants to 
see you. 
(R. 974) 
Wall then went on to describe the robber, substantially 
corroborating what had been said by describing the robber as 
being a white male, between 5*7" and 5'9", of medium build with 
brown hair (R. 974-75) . 
Detective Bell of the Salt Lake City Police, Robbery 
Section, investigated the robbery of Self's. He interviewed John 
Thomas and had Thomas build a composite drawing of the robber (R. 
917-18). Detective Bell then showed Thomas a photo spread which 
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did not include a picture of the defendant, and Thomas could not 
choose one (R. 920-21). Bell showed Thomas another photo spread 
a month later which included a picture of the defendant* Thomas 
identified the photo of the defendant as being the robber (R. 
921-23). Bell testified that "I believe Mr. Thomas told me he 
was positive that this gentleman here was the person who robbed 
him [indicating the photo of the defendant]" (R. 924). 
On April 25, 1984f the Defendant was arrested in 
Portland, Oregon, on fugitive warrants out of Weber County (based 
upon charges unrelated to those which are the subject of this 
appeal). On May 11, 1984, the defendant's Oregon parole was 
revoked by Oregon authorities and he was committed to the Oregon 
State Penitentiary (hereafter "OSP") (R. 45). 
Weber County lodged a detainer with OSP against 
defendant on the charges under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, Utah Code Ann. S 77-29-5 et. seq. (1953, as amended) 
(hereafter "IAD") (R. 45). On June 27, 1984, Weber County 
requested temporary custody of defendant from OSP for prosecution 
under Article IV of the IAD (R. 303). On July 12, 1984, Oregon 
acknowledged Weber County's request for temporary custody and 
sent Weber County the inmate status report required by Article 
IV(b) of the IAD. OSP eventually granted Weber County's request 
for temporary custody, and on August 17, 1984, defendant was 
transported to Weber County Jail for prosecution on Weber 
County's charges (R. 309). He claims no irregularity with these 
proceedings under the IAD. 
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Meanwhile, sometime before July 23, 1984, Salt Lake 
County officials learned that defendant was incarcerated in the 
OSP, and lodged detainers on him with the OSP authorities under 
the IAD for the charges arising out of the robbery of Self's, 
among other robberies (R. 309). Before Salt Lake County 
authorities could file their own request for temporary custody of 
defendant under Article IV of the IAD, they learned on September 
19, 1984, that defendant had been transferred to the Weber County 
Jail (R. 109) • Accordingly, on September 19, 1984, Salt Lake 
County authorities filed arrest warrants directly on the 
defendant while he was being held as a pretrial detainee at the 
Weber County Jail on Weber County's charges (R. 109). 
On January 28, 1985, the defendant was brought to Salt 
Lake County for preliminary hearing on the Salt Lake charges, and 
was returned to Weber County Jail (R. 310)• 
On February 8, 1985, the defendant was arraigned in 
Third District Court on the Salt Lake charges and was returned to 
Weber County Jail (R. 310). 
Defendant pled guilty to the Weber County charges on 
February 10, 1985, and received a sentence to the Utah State 
Prison. Following these proceedings, he was transported to the 
Salt Lake County Jail to await trial on the Salt Lake charges. 
Shortly thereafter, on February 21, defendant moved to dismiss 
all charges brought against him by Salt Lake County, (R. 184) on 
two inconsistent theories: (1) that Salt Lake officials had not 
properly presented an Article IV IAD request for temporary 
custody to OSP officials to secure custody to try him; and (2) 
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that the 120-day period provided for in Article IV of the IAD in 
which prosecutors must bring him to trial had run because Salt 
Lake County failed to bring the defendant to trial within 120 
days of either his arriving in Utah or of the filing of the 
arrest warrants on the defendant at the Weber County Jail on 
September 19, 1984.1 
Notably, Salt Lake County had never requested temporary 
custody of defendant from OSP under Article IV, nor had defendant 
ever made a request for disposition of the Salt Lake charges 
under Article III of the IAD. Salt Lake County had merely lodged 
a detainer against defendant with Oregon authorities under the 
IAD. Judge David B. Dee agreed with defendant's first theory, 
declining to dismiss the charges,2 but ordering that the 
defendant be returned to the OSP (R. 108-110). (See Addendum A.) 
The court later clarified its order, articulating that the 
defendant could not then be tried in Salt Lake County, because 
the Salt Lake County officials had never sought nor received 
* The latter argument would clearly be frivolous if the former 
argument prevailed for if there had not been an Article IV 
request for temporary custody, the 120-day period under article 
IV would never have commenced. 
* Unfortunately, the court's order states that all proceedings 
are dismissed and the defendant is ordered back to OSP. However, 
when read in context with the judge's findings and conclusions, 
it is clear he merely found that Salt Lake had improperly gained 
custody over the defendant because no request for temporary 
custody had been made on OSP officials. He did not find that 
Utah lacked jurisdiction over the defendant on the charges and he 
reserved ruling on defendant's other issue until he could be 
returned to Utah (R. 108-110). (See Addendum A.) Indeed, after 
defendant was returned, he renewed his prior motion, thus 
indicating that the case had not, in fact, been previously 
dismissed. 
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authority from the Oregon officials to dispose of the Salt Lake 
County charges before his return to OSP under Article IV of the 
IAD, (R. 108-10) • The court, in anticipation that defendant 
would be returned to Utah under the IAD or by extradition, 
reserved ruling on the 120-day issue of defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss under Article IV(c) of the IAD (R. 614). The defendant 
was ordered sent back to the OSP (R. 110)• 
Prior to May 17, 1985, defendant was paroled from the 
OSP and was returned to Utah to start serving his sentence on the 
Weber County convictions. Upon motion of the State, trial on the 
Salt Lake County cases was reset for July 15, 1985 (R. 91). 
Defendant, through his counsel, filed a legion of 
pretrial motions, delaying the start of trial until May 5, 1986 
(R. 1547 (two motions), 1587, 1616 (four motions), 1669, etc.). 
One of the motions made on June 12, 1985, renewed the claim that 
Salt Lake County had violated Article IV of the IAD by not trying 
him within 120 days after the arrest warrants were served on him 
at the Weber County Jail (R. 93)• Defendant further contended 
that because he was available to Salt Lake County for prosecution 
while he was in Utah, the 120-day period should be deemed to have 
commenced from the time the arrest warrants were served (R. 104). 
This motion was denied (£&£. Addendum B) and defendant petitioned 
for an interlocutory appeal in the Utah Supreme Court. See 
Addenda C and D. The petition was denied by this Court on 
October 25, 1985 (&££. Addendum E). 
On May 14, 1986, a jury found the defendant guilty of 
aggravated robbery for the robbery of the Self's food store on 
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March 10, 1984 (R. 1067), and the following day found the 
defendant not guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person (R. 1132) . The defendant waived the jury for 
the determination of the habitual criminal charge, and the trial 
judge found the defendant guilty of being an habitual criminal 
(R. 1146). The convictions were entered prior to when this 
Court's ruling on State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (June 20# 1986) was 
announced. After a number of post-trial motions, the judge 
finally sentenced the defendant on January 7, 1987, to five years 
to life in the Utah State Prison for the aggravated robbery 
charge and concurrent five years to life for the habitual 
criminal conviction, the sentences running concurrently with the 
sentences the defendant was already serving in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 1252-1254). 
STATE v. STILLING CHRONOLOGY 
1984 
March 10: Robbery of Self's is committed, 
April 25: Defendant is arrested in Portland, Oregon on 
fugitive warrants out of Weber County. 
May 11: Defendant's Oregon parole revoked and 
Defendant is committed to OSP. 
June 27: Weber County requests temporary custody of 
defendant from OSP under Article IV of the IAD 
based upon a detainer they had previously 
lodged with OSP on their charges. 
July 12: OSP approves Weber County's request for 
temporary custody. 
sometime before 
July 23: Salt Lake County lodges detainer with OSP on 
the Self's market robbery charges. 
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August 17: 
September 19: 
Defendant is transported to Weber County Jail 
pursuant to Weber's request for temporary 
custody under the IAD. 
Salt Lake County learns defendant is in Utah 
and files arrest warrants against Defendant at 
the Weber County Jail. 
January 28: 
February 8: 
February 10; 
February 21: 
April 10: 
May 17: 
June 12: 
May 14-15: 
January 7: 
1985 
Defendant brought to Salt Lake County for 
Preliminary Hearing. 
Defendant brought to Salt Lake County for 
Arraignment. Trial set for March 4. 
Defendant pleads guilty to charges in Weber 
County and is sentenced, ending their 
proceedings against him. Defendant is then 
transported to Salt Lake County for trial. 
Defendant moves to dismiss the charges brought 
against him by Salt Lake County. 
Court makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on the motion to dismiss. Defendant is 
returned to OSP. 
Oregon paroled the Defendant and sent him to 
the Utah State Prison to begin serving 
sentence from Weber County conviction. Salt 
Lake County continues where it left off in the 
previous prosecution, and files arrest 
warrants on Defendant. 
The Defendant renews motion to dismiss 
charges. Trial court denies motion. 
1986 
Defendant is convicted of robbery of the 
Self's Foodland and of being an habitual 
criminal. 
1987 
Defendant sentenced to five years to life in 
the Utah State Prison for the aggravated 
robbery and a concurrent five years to life 
for the habitual criminal charge. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly refused to dismiss the charges 
against defendant because there was no violation of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"). The purpose behind 
the IAD (to enable prisoners to participate in prison 
rehabilitational programming free of the constraints of pending 
untired criminal charges) is not present in this case. The 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers does not apply when the inmate 
is being held as a pre-trial detainee awaiting trial on charges. 
Salt Lake County never filed for temporary custody 
under Article IV of the IAD so as to trigger the running of the 
120-day time limits of Article IV. 
Even if Article IV of the IAD did applyf the defendant 
would not have been "available for trial" to Salt Lake County 
while Weber County was disposing of their charges against him, 
and so therefore the 120 days could not have begun to run until 
Weber County's prosecution was ended. 
Assuming Salt Lake County did not properly obtain 
temporary custody over the defendant under the provisions of the 
IAD at the time of his arraignment and preliminary hearing on the 
Salt Lake County charges, the jurisdiction of the lower court's 
at that time was not defeated and there was no need to rearraign 
him or accord him another preliminary hearing on those charges. 
The defendant's right to a speedy trial was not 
violated. First, the concerns behind the speedy trial provisions 
are not present in this case, as the defendant was serving jail 
time on other charges when Salt Lake County proceedings were 
brought against him. 
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Assuming, arguendo, that the purposes behind the speedy 
trial provisions were present, the facts of the case show that 
the delays in starting trial were not because of any intentional 
actions on the part of the State. 
The trial judge's refusal to give a cautionary 
eyewitness identification warning to the jury was within his 
discretion and did not constitute error. This Court has 
expressly made the instructions mandated in State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) , prospective rather than retroactive. The 
view that cautionary eyewitness identification instructions rises 
to the level of Constitutional deprivation of rights has not been 
shared by this Court, nor by the federal courts. Rather, the 
mandating of cautionary eyewitness identifications has been done 
as an exercise of the Courts1 supervisory capacity over the trial 
courts. 
Finally, the trial court sentenced the defendant 
correctly under the Habitual Criminal Statute, Utah Code Ann. S 
76-8-1001 (1953, as amended). The clear language of the statute, 
buttressed by similar sentencing since the passage of the statute 
and this Court's clear approval of the statute, indicate that the 
trial court did what was statutorily mandated and judicially 
sound in sentencing the defendant as it did. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISMISS 
THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT BECAUSE THERE 
WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT 
ON DETAINERS, UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-29-5 
(1953), AS AMENDED. 
At the outset, it must be noted that the purpose of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code Ann. S 77-29-5 
(1953, as amended), (hereafter "IAD"), is to provide a mechanism 
for prisoners serving a term of imprisonment to insist upon 
speedy and final disposition of untried charges that are the 
subjects of detainers so that prison rehabilitation programs 
initiated for a prisoner's benefit will not be disrupted or 
precluded by the existence of the untried charges. Article I of 
IAD; People v. Hioinbotham. 712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1986) 
(citations omitted). Accord, Cuyler v. Adams. 449 U.S. 433, 448-
49 (1981); U.S. v. Currier. 836 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1987). The 
provisions of the IAD are to be liberally construed so as to 
effectuate this underlying purpose. Article IX of IAD. The 
facts of this case reflect that defendant, due to his extensive 
criminal activity in multiple jurisdictions, was hardly in a 
position to participate in prison rehabilitational programming at 
OSP during the period of time Salt Lake County was diligently 
seeking to bring him to trial. Defendant, for the most part, was 
being held as a pre-trial detainee in the Weber County Jail 
during the critical period in issue, and not incarcerated in a 
facility where rehabilitation programs were even available to 
him. (Defendant does not contest the lawfulness of his 
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incarceration in Weber County.) Nor does the IAD apply to 
persons housed as pre-trial detainees. Dorsey v. State. 490 
N.E.2d 260 (Ind. 1986). It applies strictly to "a person who has 
entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional 
institution." Article III (a) of IAD. Although defendant had 
entered on a term of imprisonment at OSP# he was in the temporary 
custody of Weber County in the status of a pre-trial detainee at 
the time Salt Lake County was seeking him. Thus, the overriding 
purpose of guaranteeing prisoners access to rehabilitational 
programing free of untried charges pending over themf is not 
really present in this case. Nevertheless, defendant seeks to 
take advantage of a strained interpretation of provisions of the 
IAD in an effort to have the charges against him dismissed 
without regard for the true purpose behind the IAD. 
Secondly, the facts clearly reflect that as soon as 
Salt Lake authorities learned of the defendants whereabouts, 
they acted diligently and promptly to attempt to bring him to 
trial (thus satisfying any speedy trial concerns which might have 
arisen). Yet, defendant seeks to punish Salt Lake County for its 
diligence in acting promptly to bring him to trial—the very 
interest the IAD was designed to protect. At most, Salt Lake 
County can be criticized for trying to act too promptly to bring 
him to trial. However, it is difficult to see where defendant 
has suffered any real prejudice by Salt Lake County's action. 
Defendant's proposed reading of certain provisions of the IAD 
needs to be reviewed with the above principles in mind. 
-13-
Defendant asserts that Salt Lake County's charges 
should have been dismissed because he was not brought to trial 
within the 120-day period contemplated by Article IV of the IAD. 
He contends that because he was "available" to Salt Lake County 
during the time he was in Utah being held on the Weber County 
charges, the 120-day period should be deemed to have commenced 
either upon his arrival in Utah or at least when Salt Lake County 
served its warrant on him. This interpretation goes far beyond 
the terms of the IAD. Article IV, unlike Article III, was 
intended to provide a remedy for prosecutors to bring prisoners 
to trial during the period of the prisoner's incarceration in 
another state's jurisdiction (to avoid the case becoming state, 
etc.). Article IV is the prosecutor's half of the IAD. Q£« 
Brown v. District Court. 571 P.2d 1091, 1092-93 (Colo. 1977) 
(purpose of IAD is to provide expeditious, simplified method of 
disposing of outstanding criminal charges. As such, it is 
generally designed to benefit the states, not the prisoners)• 
Any right a defendant might have to get charges disposed of lies 
within Article III of the IAD.3 Article IV entitles prosecutors 
in a state where untried charges are pending, if they so choose. 
to acquire temporary custody of a prisoner against whom they have 
lodged a detainer. Under Article IV, if the prosecutor makes a 
request for temporary custody, trial proceedings roust be 
commenced "within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the 
3 Article III authorizes a defendant, if he or she so chooses, to 
request disposition of the detainer by the jurisdiction where the 
untried charges are pending. Defendant never made such a request 
in this case. 
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receiving state." In the instant case, it is undisputed that 
Salt Lake County never made a formal request on OSP authorities 
under Article IV of the IAD for temporary custody of defendant. 
Indeed, in his initial motion to Judge Deer defendant 
successfully asserted this position which led to defendant's 
return to OSP and a cessation of the Salt Lake prosecution.4 
This ruling clearly comports with the provisions of Article IV of 
the IAD. Without such a request, the 120-day period of Article 
IV was never triggered. 
Article IV(b) does provide that if a prosecutor in a 
particular state makes a request for temporary custody under 
Article IV, the prison authorities shall furnish that prosecutor 
in the receiving state with a certificate stating the current 
status of the prisoner (e.g. the term of the prisoner's 
commitment, time already served, time remaining to be served, 
good time earned, etc.) . Article IV(b) also requires that the 
prison authorities "simultaneously shall furnish all other 
officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have 
lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates 
4
 Judge Dee stated that Salt Lake County had lodged a detainer 
with OSP and that Salt Lake County, by transferring defendant 
from Weber County to Salt Lake County, without first filing a 
request for temporary custody pursuant to Article IV(a) of the 
IAD violated the terms of the IAD. In his later Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal, defendant expressly stated that he "does 
not contest the propriety of Judge Dee's conclusions of law" on 
this finding. Defendant's latest claim that the 120 days should 
be deemed to have run because he was "available" for prosecution 
to Salt Lake County flies in the face of his earlier argument 
that he was not available for prosecution and should have been 
returned to OSP because an Article IV request had not been made 
by Salt Lake authorities. 
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and with notices informing them of the [other prosecutor's] 
requests for custody or availability and of the reason therefor." 
£££ al££ Boyd v. State. 441 A.2d 1133 (Md. App. 1982); People v. 
&ax&&Ri 414 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (N.Y. 1979). The record does not 
disclose whether or not OSP officials formally served Salt Lake 
County with this certificate of inmate status. Assuming they 
did, this would not obligate Salt Lake County to do anything 
under the IAD. There is absolutely no requirement that a 
prosecutor ever make a request for temporary custody under 
Article IV. One receiving state prosecutor's decision to 
prosecute charges and obtain temporary custody of a defendant 
under Article IV(a) is in no way binding on other prosecutors in 
the receiving state. Fasano v. Hall, 476 F. Supp. 291# 293 (D.C. 
Mass. 1979).5 Article IV(b) is provided merely as an 
informational courtesy to other prosecutors in the receiving 
state to file for temporary custody if they so choose. Salt Lake 
County never chose to file for temporary custody under Article IV 
to trigger Article IV's time provisions. Article IV does not 
create a right of disposition of charges for a prisoner only 
Article III does that. While it is true that when Salt Lake 
County eventually learned that the defendant was in the Weber 
County Jail, they attempted to take custody to commence their 
prosecution of him before his return to Oregon, this action 
cannot be construed as an invokation of the provisions of Article 
5 The decision of the district court was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals, Fasano v. Hall. 615 F.2d 555 (1st Cir. 1980), CfiZLt* 
dfiHifilf 449 U.S. 867 (1980)• 
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IV. and Judge Dee so found. Article IV(a) requires the 
prosecutor to present "a written request for temporary custody or 
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which 
the prisoner is incarcerated" and further requires "the court 
having jurisdiction of such • . . information" to have "duly 
approved, recorded, and transmitted the request." Article IV(a) 
then gives the prisoner 30 days to seek intervention by his 
governor who determines whether or not to honor the prosecutor's 
request. Salt Lake County's actions in directly serving its 
warrant on defendant in the Weber County Jail bear no resemblance 
to these procedures. Accordingly, Salt Lake County was precluded 
from continuing to proceed against defendant until the procedures 
of the IAD were properly complied with. Article IV clearly was 
never invoked in defendant's case so as to trigger its 120-day 
provisions. 
Assuming OSP did not issue an inmate status certificate 
to Salt Lake County officials under Article IV(b) to notify them 
of defendant's temporary transfer to Utah, such would not provide 
a basis for dismissal of the charges against defendant. 
WUUfrmg Vt gtate, 426 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. App. 1983) , 
petition fat review djanjjed., 437 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1983), contains 
facts virtually identical to the instant case. Marion County, 
Florida, obtained temporary custody of defendant from a New York 
prison to prosecute. New York prison officials failed to notify 
Union County, Florida, of the prisoner's availability as provided 
in Article IV(b) of the IAD. After his conviction in Marion 
County, the prisoner was returned to New York. He was later sent 
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to the Florida State Prison at which time Union County, Florida, 
commenced its proceedings against him on their charges. 
Defendant moved to dismiss claiming that because he was available 
for trial when he was previously in Marion County, Florida, 
Article IV's 120-day time limit had run. The court found: 
It is clear that the New York authorities 
failed to give notice to Union County that 
Williams was being brought to Florida as 
required by [Article IV(b) which] states that 
[i]n respect of any proceeding made possible 
by this subsection, trial shall be commenced 
within 120 days of the arrival of the 
prisoner in the receiving state..•• 
*** 
[W]e fail to see why the State of Florida 
should be denied the right to enforce its 
criminal laws because of the oversight of the 
State of New York. 
Id. at 1122. In State v. Barefield. 735 P.2d 1339 (Wash. App. 
1987), the court found that the failure of prison officials in 
the sending state to comply with provisions of the IAD should not 
result in dismissal of charges in the receiving state. It 
reasoned that: 
Having considered the foregoing cases, we 
conclude that Congress intended sanctions to 
be applied only where they are expressly 
allowed under the IAD. To conclude otherwise 
would result in ad hoc determinations by 
individual member states determining whether 
officials had acted 'promptly1• It is for 
Congress, not the courts, to set time limits 
for giving notice and for forwarding 
materials. We, therefore, hold that 
dismissal under the IAD is not mandated in 
this case. 
&• Colt v. State. 440 So. 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (IAD 
prompt notice provisions directory; violation does not result in 
dismissal of charges); State v. Clark. 222 Kan. 65, 563 P.2d 1028 
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(1977) (IAD prompt notice provision directory; IAD has no 
sanction for failure to comply); Commonwealth v. Gonce* 320 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 19, 466 A.2d 1039 (1983) (dismissal allowed only under 
explicit provisions of the IAD.) 
As noted above, because prosecutors are not obligated 
by Article IV to request temporary custody of a prisoner, there 
was no requirement that Salt Lake County pursue an Article IV 
request after defendant was returned to OSP. Moreover, the 
defendant certainly was not precluded from seeking prompt 
disposition of those charges by filing his own request under 
Article III of the IAD. This he chose not to do. It was 
appropriate for Salt Lake authorities to await defendant's return 
to Utah to serve his Weber County sentence before resuming its 
prosecution against him. The amount of time from when defendant 
was returned to the OSP until he was paroled to the Utah State 
Prison was approximately one month (April 10 - May 17, 1985) (R. 
311), hardly time enough to justify Salt Lake County going 
through the motions of requesting temporary custody of defendant. 
Once he was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison the terms of 
the IAD no longer applied, and any remedy for prompt disposition 
of any other Utah charges pending against him would lie under 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-29-1 (1953), as amended. Petitioner did not 
avail himself of this provision. 
Assuming the 120-day provision of the IAD did apply, 
there is serious doubt whether defendant was always "available" 
for prosecution to Salt Lake County during the entire time he was 
being held in the Weber County Jail. Clearly, he was not 
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available while Weber County was disposing of its charges against 
him. It is unrealistic to assume that the 120-day period should 
be running at all times defendant was in Utah or even after he 
had been served with Salt Lake County's warrant. Article VI(a) 
of the IAD provides that: 
In determining the duration and expiration 
dates of the time periods provided in 
articles III and IV of this agreement, the 
running of said time periods shall be tolled 
whenever and for as long as the prisoner is 
unable to stand trial, as determined by the 
court having jurisdiction of the matter. 
See United States v. Roy. 830 F.2d 628, 634-35 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Article VI exempts from the governance of the IAD time when 
prisoner is unable to stand trial; time when prisoner was in 
state to stand trial on federal charges, he was "unable to stand 
trial" on state charges (citing Young v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 339, 
343)). Until the charges in Weber County were settled, defendant 
was not able to stand trial in Salt Lake County. This makes 
sense from a policy standpoint. If a defendant were facing 
charges from every single county in Utah, and all of them had 
lodged detainers with the Oregon State Prison, they could not all 
be expected to bring the defendant to trial within the same 120 
days. Defendant was "unable to stand trial" until charges 
against him were clear in the first jurisdiction gaining custody 
of him. The charges against defendant were not resolved and he 
was not available for trial until he entered his guilty plea and 
was sentenced in Weber County on February 13, 1985. Between the 
time that the guilty plea was entered (Feb. 13) and the defendant 
moved to dismiss Salt Lake County's charges (Feb. 21), just over 
one week had elapsed. 
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Finally, petitioner claims United States v. Mauro, 436 
U.S. 340 (1978), mandates dismissal of the Salt Lake charges. He 
claims that once the application of the IAD is triggered (i.e., 
when Salt Lake County filed its detainer with Oregon Correctional 
authorities) , then the 120-day period commences when the 
"receiving State" initiates disposition of its charges. He 
overreads both the IAD and HaiULQ> 
The Mauro court (in Mr. Ford's case) merely held that 
the United States is a party to the IAD, and that when the 
federal government lodges a detainer with a State correctional 
official requesting that a State prisoner be made available for 
prosecution, and obtains custody by way of a writ of habeas 
corpus ai prosequendum instead of the use of a request for 
temporary custody, it has effectually activated Article IV of the 
IAD and it must bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days as 
required by Article IV(c). With the detainer already lodged with 
the correctional officials, the writ was viewed as tantamount to 
a "written request for temporary custody" within the meaning of 
Article IV(a). Mr. Ford, unlike petitioner, had also made 
repeated requests for a speedy trial. In petitioner's case, no 
semblance of any request for temporary custody was ever made by 
Salt Lake officials on Oregon officials. Thus, Article IV was 
never triggered at all* 
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POINT II 
ASSUMING SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT PROPERLY 
OBTAIN TEMPORARY CUSTODY OVER THE DEFENDANT 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE IAD AT THE TIME 
OF HIS ARRAIGNMENTS AND PRELIMINARY HEARING 
ON THE SALT LAKE COUNTY CHARGESf THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURTS AT THAT TIME 
WAS NOT DEFEATED AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO 
REARRAIGN HIM OR ACCORD HIM ANOTHER 
PRELIMINARY HEARING ON THOSE CHARGES. 
Defendant asserts that because (1) Judge Dee had ruled 
that Salt Lake County officials had improperly obtained custody 
over defendant when they served him with warrants while he was in 
Weber County Jail rather than properly requesting temporary 
custody from Oregon officials under Article IV of the IAD; and 
(2) because Judge Dee dismissed all Salt Lake County proceedings 
at that time and ordered defendant returned to Oregon, it was 
necessary to rearraign defendant and provide him with another 
preliminary hearing when proceedings were reinitiated after his 
transfer to the Utah State Prison. Otherwise, defendant claims 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him. 
As previously notedf it is not totally clear that Judge 
Dee, in fact, intended to dismiss all proceedings against 
defendant rather than merely stay them when he initially ruled on 
defendant's motion to dismiss the charges on April 10, 1985. 
Despite the unfortunate language in his Order dismissing the 
"proceedings11 (as opposed to charges) , his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law indicate an intent to return defendant to 
Oregon but not to vacate all proceedings which had already 
occurred on the Salt Lake County charges. In his April 10 
Conclusions of Law, he stated: 
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Salt Lake County now cannot legally obtain 
custody of the defendant for trial on the 
above charges by simply serving him with 
warrants while he is in Utah temporarily 
pursuant to the Weber County request for 
temporary custody. 
(Emphasis added.) (See Addendum A). Later, when defendant 
renewed his prior motion to dismiss, Judge Dee issued new 
Findings and Conclusions on September 25, 1985, stating that: 
[T]his Court declined to dismiss these cases 
but ordered that defendant be returned to the 
custody of the Oregon State officials pending 
proceedings under either Article III or 
Article IV, IAD.... 
£££ Addendum B. See jalsa (R* 611-12) . 
In any event, defendant appears to be confusing 
"custody" with "jurisdiction". The fact that Salt Lake County 
prosecutors improperly obtained custody over defendant, did not 
deprive the courts before which defendant appeared for 
arraignment and preliminary hearing of jurisdiction over him. 
Nor did irregularities in the earlier proceedings as to 
defendant's custody deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to 
try him. 
The manner in which a court gains jurisdiction over a 
defendant does not affect the validity of the judgment against 
him. 
in Frisbie Vt Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 s. 
Ct. 509 (1952), the Supreme Court stated: 
This Court has never departed from the 
rule announced in Ker v. Illinois* 119 
U.S. 436, 444, 7 S. Ct. 225, 229, 30 L. 
Ed. 421 (1886), that the power of a court 
to try a person for crime is not impaired 
by the fact that he had been brought 
within the court's jurisdiction by reason 
of a "forcible abduction". No persuasive 
reasons are now presented to justify 
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overruling this line of cases. They rest 
on the sound basis that due process of law 
is satisfied when one present in court is 
convicted of crime after having been 
fairly apprised of the charges against him 
and after a fair trial in accordance with 
constitutional procedural guidelines. 
There is nothing in the Constitution that 
requires a court to permit a guilty person 
rightfully convicted to escape justice 
because he was brought to trial against 
his will. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Here the record reflects that defendant was 
convicted "after a fair trial in accordance 
with constitutional safeguards." That he was 
brought before the Utah court in the face of 
a pending proceeding in California attacking 
his extradition does not impair his 
conviction. 
State v. Anderson. 618 P.2d 42 (Utah 1980). £££ 9l?P BrPWH Vt 
District Court. 571 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Colo. 1977). 
In State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), this 
Court found that even assuming defendant had been illegally 
arrested, the court was not deprived of jurisdiction: 
A majority of courts have followed "the 
established rule that illegal arrest or 
detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction. Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103, 
119, 95 S. Ct. 854, 865, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 
(1975) (citing Frisbie Vt Collins* 342 U.S. 
519, 72 S. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541 (1952), and 
Ker V, ZUinPiSr H 9 U.S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225, 
30 L. Ed. 421 (1886)). This Court followed 
that line of cases in State v. Beck. Utah, 
584 P.2d 870 (1978). That opinion states: 
"The 'probable cause1 required for a warrant 
of arrest, if lacking, may prevent the 
introduction of illegally seized evidence at 
the trial, but it does not prevent the trial 
and conviction of the defendant." Id., at 872 
*** 
In Gerstein. the Court viewed the probable 
cause requirement for arrest warrants as a 
protection against illegal detention. 
Therefore, once the risk of illegal detention 
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has dissipated, i.e., by the time a trial has 
been heldf the protection is no longer 
relevant or necessary because other 
constitutional safeguards have come into 
play. Under this analysis, the probable 
cause requirement for an arrest warrant 
becomes moot by the time a defendant has been 
convicted because the much more stringent 
requirements of proof at trial have been 
employed to protect the defendant. 
We are convinced that the "protection" 
analysis employed by the Supreme Court in 
Gerstein is valid, and we reject the position 
that the probable cause requirement for 
arrest warrants is jurisdictional. We note 
that the only prejudice to the defendant 
resulting from what may have been an invalid 
arrest was that period of detention he 
experienced prior to preliminary examination 
and judicial determination of probable cause 
for trial. In light of his subsequent 
conviction, that temporary period of possibly 
wrongful detention is of minimal significance 
and does not warrant reversal of an otherwise 
valid conviction. 
Id. at 271-72. 
Thus, even if Salt Lake County had not properly 
obtained custody over defendant when he was arraigned and when 
the preliminary hearing was held, the courts did not lack 
jurisdiction over him when these stages of the criminal 
proceedings occurred. There was no need to duplicate these 
proceedings before proceeding to trial, and the trial court so 
found when it denied defendant's motion to remand the case to 
circuit court (R. 313). The State does not dispute the 
importance of the preliminary hearing and arraignment stages of 
the criminal process. But the defendant was clearly given a fair 
"examination and commitment by a magistrate", Utah Constitution, 
Art. 1, Section 13, and was given a preliminary hearing in accord 
with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-7(C)(d)(1) . 
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POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS 
NOT VIOLATED 
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution, Amendment VI; Utah Constitution, Article I. 
Section 12. £££ alsja Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(f) (1953, as 
amended). The right is: 
...not primarily intended to prevent 
prejudice to the defense caused by passage of 
time; that interest is protected primarily by 
the Due Process Clause and by statutes of 
limitations. The speedy trial guarantee is 
designed to minimize the possibility of 
lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to 
reduce the lesser, but nevertheless 
substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on 
an accused while on bail, and to shorten the 
disruption of life caused by arrest and the 
presence of unresolved criminal charges. 
United States v. McDonald * 456 U.S. l, 8 (1982). The focus is on 
the impairment or "restraint on personal liberty, disruption of 
employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public 
obloguy. ..." id., at 9. See al££, United States v. Marion, 404 
U.S. 307, 320 (1971). Similarly, in State v. Weddle. 506 P.2d 
67, 68 (Utah 1973), this Court noted that: 
The right to a speedy trial assured by our 
Constitution refers, of course, not to the 
speed at which trial proceeds, but rather to 
the right of an accused to be brought to 
trial without undue delay. This is a right 
of ancient origin which arose because of 
abuses wherein people were kept in custody 
for unreasonable periods of time without 
trial and even without knowing any abuse of 
that character. But in the absence thereof, 
it should not be extended as a mere 
abstraction of law in circumstances where 
there is no justification for its 
application. The statement itself is general 
and there is no particular length of time 
which can be specified as a standard in all 
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instances in order to avoid infringement of 
the right. The correct application of the 
principle depends upon the facts of each 
case. The total picture should be looked at 
to see whether there has been any such abuse 
of imposition upon the accused as the 
provision was designed to protect against, so 
that he was prejudiced in having a fair trial 
and just treatment under the law. 
In State V> Archuleta, 577 P.2d 547 (Utah 1977), this Court 
stated: 
The purpose of those constitutional 
provisions is to guard against any 
intentional delay which may be oppressive or 
prosecutorial in nature. U.S. v. Ewell. 383 
U.S. 116, 86 S. Ct. 773, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627 
(1966) . 
I&. at 548. 
The concerns behind speedy trial provisions are not 
present in the instant case. The defendant was already serving 
time in the OSP when Salt Lake County lodged detainers against 
him, and he was serving time in the Utah State Prison for crimes 
committed in Weber County at the time of his trial. Under such 
circumstances, the concerns for loss of liberty, disruption of 
employment, strain on financial resources (especially since he 
was using the services of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association) and exposure to public obloguy are clearly 
nonexistent. 
Assuming the purposes behind the speedy trial 
provisions were present in this case, the facts of each case 
should be reviewed. The United States Supreme Court has noted 
that whether the federal speedy trial right has been violated is 
determined by balancing the "...length of delay, the reason for 
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice 
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to the defendant* Barker v. Winoo. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
Similar considerations also apply to the Utah Constitution. 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187f 1193 (Utah 1984) (disavowed for 
different reasons in State v. Ossana. 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Knill. 656 P.2d 1026f 1029 (Utah 1982); State Vt 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982); State v. Hafen, 593 
P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1979); State v. Giles. 576 P.2d 876, 879 
(Utah 1978). This Court elaborated on the above factors in 
Weddle as follows: 
In making that determination, where there has 
been what may appear to be undue delay, it is 
important to consider whether or not there 
was justification for it including: (1) 
which party caused it; (2) whether it may 
have been willful and/or for some improper 
purpose; (3) whether the defendant was aware 
of his rights; (4) whether he made known his 
desire for a speedy trial; (5) whether by 
words or conduct there was explicit or 
implicit waiver; and (6) whether the 
proceeding was completed as soon as 
reasonably could be done in the 
circumstances. 
Weddle, 506 P.2d at 68. Application of these factors 
demonstrates no violation of defendant's speedy trial rights. 
The defendant was transported to the Weber County Jail 
on August 17, 1984, on the basis of a detainer and a request for 
temporary custody that was filed with OSP by Weber County. 
Between that time and February 13, 1985, the defendant was 
awaiting the disposition of the charges against him by the Weber 
County authorities and was, in the interpretation by United 
States v. Roy. 830 F.2d at 634, "unable to stand trial" in Salt 
Lake County. 
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By the time the defendant was able to stand trial, the 
defense counsel moved for dismissal of the case (R. 184). This 
was followed by a number of motions from the defense, including 
three different substitutions of counsel. The prosecution did 
not file nearly as many motions as the defense did, and the 
continuances were accepted by both parties. In Barker# where the 
delay between arrest and trial was over five years with the 
conviction still upheld, the Supreme Court stated: 
Closely related to length of delay is the 
reason the government assigns to justify the 
delay. Here, too, different weights should 
be assigned to different reasons. A 
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in 
order to hamper the defense should be weighed 
more heavily against the government. A more 
neutral reason such as negligence or 
overcrowded prisons should be weighed less 
heavily but nevertheless should be considered 
since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the government 
rather than with the defendant., Finally, a 
valid reason, such as a missing witness, 
should serve to justify appropriate delay. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Defendant's unavailability to stand trial mainly 
because of the actions of his own counsel should not be weighed 
against the government. There is no evidence in the record of 
any intentional delays on the part of the government, either with 
the County Attorney's Office or with the trial court, and the 
defendant has not shown any such intent. 
In State v. Archuleta. 577 P.2d at 548-49 (Utah 1977), 
referring to the right of speedy trial, this Court stated: 
[T]he court does not lose jurisdiction • • 
• unless there is some intentional delay of 
an oppressive character, which results in 
prejudice to the defendant!.) 
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Not only should delays by defense counsel be looked upon as 
unoppressive per ££, but also the defendant has not shown 
prejudice against him by the delays; in factf the trial court 
granted the defendant time for jail time served (R. 1254). The 
issue of prejudice was also addressed in Barker; 
Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As 
the time between the commission of the crime 
and trial lengthens, witnesses may become 
unavailable or their memories may fade. If 
the witnesses support the prosecution, its 
case may well be weakened, sometimes 
seriously so. And it is the prosecution 
which carries the burden of proof. Thus, 
unlike the right to counsel or the right to 
be free from compelled self-incrimination, 
deprivation of the right to speedy trial does 
not per se prejudice the accused's ability to 
defend himself. 
Barker. 407 U.S. at 521-22. In the instant case, the State's 
case was comprised totally of witnesses and police, whereas the 
defense relied on videotaped depositions taped at a given time 
and not subject to the same threat of fading memory, etc. listed 
in fcaiJlfil.* 
Evaluation of the prejudice suffered by the defendant 
should be assessed in light of the interests which the speedy 
trial right was designed to protect* Those interests are not 
present where the defendant is serving a sentence for a prior 
conviction, and he receives credit for time served as well. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE A 
CAUTIONARY EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION WARNING 
TO THE JURY WAS WITHIN HIS DISCRETION AND DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE ERROR. 
Defendant claims that he was deprived of due process of 
law by the trial court's refusal to give his requested cautionary 
eyewitness identification instruction to the jury. Defendant 
bases this claim on the holding in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986), wherein this Court held that such cautionary 
instructions on eyewitness identification were mandatory. 
The Court's ruling in Long was expressly made 
prospective to cases tried after Long. Defendant was tried 
before Long was decided. Neverthelessf he claims that the 
issuing of cautionary eyewitness identification instructions in 
cases where eyewitness testimony is crucial is of Constitutional 
proportions, and therefore is a denial of due process for Long to 
be applied prospectively only. 
The view that eyewitness identification instruction is 
of such constitutional magnitude has not been shared by the 
federal courts. While most of the federal circuits have endorsed 
the use of some kind of eyewitness instruction in some cases, 
none of these courts have done so on the theory of due process, 
but rather as an exercise of their supervisory capacity over the 
district courts. 
The Third Circuit was the first to adopt an eyewitness 
instruction requirement, and in selecting its model instruction, 
it turned to Pennsylvania state law. It did so as an exercise of 
its supervisory capacity over the district courts, and made no 
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mention of due process whatsoever* See United States v. Barberr 
442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971) , ££i_t. d£Hi£d# 404 U.S. 846 (1971). 
Circuit courts following Barber that have addressed the 
issue of eyewitness instruction have all recognized that their 
holdings apply only to federal district courts. Seen United 
States v. Kavenaah, 572 F.2d 9, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1978) (First 
Circuit joins "eight other circuits in approving use of the 
Barber chargef or variations of it# in the discretion of the 
district court, in cases where the evidence suggests a possible 
misidentification," notes that the Barber charge was adopted by 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals from Pennsylvania state law 
and implemented in that circuit under the court of appeals's 
supervisory power over the district courts, and deems failure to 
give the instruction in this case harmless error); United States 
v. Montelbano, 605 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1979) (Second Circuit 
approves of an instruction but leaves the decision of when it is 
required to the discretion of the district court); United States 
v, Wilford. 493 F.2d 730, 733 (3d Cir.) Q&JLL. felll&l, 419 U.S. 
851 (1974) (Second Circuit adopted the Barber instruction in 
exercise of it supervisory power over district courts; district 
court in this case did not commit reversible error in failing to 
give the instruction ana sponte): United States v. Revels. 575 
F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1978) (decision on whether or not to give 
the instruction is the district court's; failure to give it here, 
if error, was harmless); United States v. Ramirez-Rizo. 809 F.2d 
1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1987) (district court acted within 
discretion in refusing to give requested instruction); United 
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States v. Boyd, 620 F.2d 129, 131 (6th Cir. 1980) cert* denied* 
449 U.S. 855 (1980) (identification instructions are within the 
discretion of the district court); United States v. Hodges. 515 
F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975) (giving of instruction is mandatory when 
identification is central issue and instruction is requested); 
United States v. Cain, 616 F.2d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(eyewitness instruction is approved of, and failure of the 
district court to give it may result in reversible error in some 
cases); United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(the giving of an eyewitness instruction is in the discretion of 
the district courts); United States v. Thoma, 713 F.2d 604, 607-8 
(10th Cir. 1983) (in district court cases where identification is 
at issue, the court must instruct the jurors specifically that 
they must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that "it was the 
defendant on trial who had committed the acts alleged11, quoting 
HcGee Vt United States, 402 F.2d 434, 436 (10th Cir. 1968), s&x±. 
denied. 394 U.S. 908 (1969), in cases where more specific 
eyewitness instructions are refused, the Tenth Circuit reviews on 
a case by case basis) Q&X±. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984); United 
States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (use of 
the Barber-type instruction is in the discretion of the district 
courts). 
The only federal cases mentioning due process in 
connection with an eyewitness instruction are habeas corpus 
cases, in which the courts of appeal must rely on the 
Constitution to determine the adequacy of the basis for the 
petitioner's confinement under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. S&&. e.g. Love 
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Yt Young # 781 F.2d 1307, 1318 (7th Cir.)# C£JLt. denied, 476 U.S. 
1185 (1986) (although the Seventh Circuit has adopted an 
identification instruction for trials in federal courts, because 
habeas corpus petitioner was attacking the failure of a state 
court to give the instruction, he was bound and failed to show 
that the failure to give the instruction "so infected the entire 
trial that the resulting conviction violates due process"); 
Cotton v, Armontrout, 784 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1986)(8th 
Circuit has "suggested" the use of an identification instruction 
when there is nothing but eyewitness testimony to identify the 
defendant, but there was no constitutional error here because 
instructions on the state's burden of proof and on the jury's 
duty to determine the credibility of witnesses adequately 
protected the petitioner); Williams v. Lockhart, 736 F.2d 1264, 
1267 (8th Cir. 1984) (petitioner, challenging the failure of the 
state court to give identification instruction, failed to meet 
his burden demonstrating that errors in jury instructions were 
sufficiently prejudicial to 'support a collateral attack on the 
constitutional validity of a state court's judgment [which] is 
even greater than the showing required to establish plain error 
on direct appeal.' Henderson v* Kibbe* 431 U.S. 145, 154 
(1977).). 
There is no argument that would justify treating the 
eyewitness instruction thusly. Even this court's language in the 
Long case itself, that the denial of the instruction "could well 
deny the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution," 721 P.2d at 492, is couched in 
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ambiguous and uncertain language. This language has not been 
used again since the Long decision in any holding dealing with 
eyewitness identification. 
Appellants reliance on Griffith v. Kentucky,, 479 U.S. 
, 107 S. Ct. (1987) , is misplaced. Had this Court felt 
bound by Griffith* it could have so held in a case decided after 
Griffith was handed down. State V. Pranchr 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
1988). In Branch# this Court continued applying the Long 
standard prospectively: 
In State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), 
we made a detailed analytical consideration 
of the reliability of eyewitness testimony 
and concluded that "in cases tried from this 
date forward, trial courts shall give such an 
instruction as requested by the defense." 
Id. at 492. This case wasf however, tried 
before Long became law. In reviewing cases 
tried before Long # we evaluate the 
defendants claim under the case law 
applicable at the time the defendant was 
tried. State v. Jonas. 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 
1986) (summarizing the crucial pre-Long case 
law) . 
State v. Branch. 743 P.2d at 1190 (Utah 1988). 
Furthermore, and in direct relation to the facts of the 
case at bar, this Court noted in pranch that: 
... there exists a substantial possibility 
that defendant has been confused in this case 
with his half brother, who closely resembles 
him. On the other hand, we have never found 
an abuse of discretion when a judge referred 
to a cautionary instruction in a case with 
more than one eyewitness* 
I&. at 1190 (emphasis added) . 
In the case before this Court, there was not one but 
four eyewitnesses (the store manager, the two cashiers, and the 
customer) who saw the robber and who gave corroborative 
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descriptions of him. In cases such as State v. Ouevedo, 735 P.2d 
51 (Utah 1987), where the facts show that at the time the events 
occurred, it was dark and the defendant was seen for only a few 
seconds, this Court found that refusal of cautionary instruction 
was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, there has been no 
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in the present 
case. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT 
CORRECTLY UNDER THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
STATUTE. 
On January 30/ 1987, the defendant was sentenced to two 
concurrent sentences of five years to life: one for his 
conviction for aggravated robbery; and one for his conviction of 
being an habitual criminal. 
Utahf like many other states/ has an Habitual Criminal 
enhancement provision: 
Any person who has been twice convicted/ 
sentenced/ and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the second degree or a 
crime which/ if committed within the state 
would have been a capital felony/ felony of 
the first degree/ or felony of the second 
degree/ and was committed to any prison mayf 
upon conviction of at least a felony of the 
second degree committed in this state/ other 
than murder in the first or second degree/ be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1953/ as amended). 
Defendant claims that sentencing him to two different 
(albeit concurrent) sentences violated the status nature of the 
habitual criminal statute. The Habitual Criminal statute does 
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not direct the sentencing judge to make the habitual criminal 
penalty a part of the sentence of any other charges of which the 
defendant is found guilty. The judge simply has the language of 
the statute to work with and the clear indication from the 
statute that a defendant will be imprisoned for from one to five 
years if he is found to be an habitual criminal. 
Utah courts have upheld the habitual criminal statute 
as written. 
As this court held in State v. Bailey. 712 P.2d 281 
(Utah 1985): 
The habitual criminal statue has consistently 
survived constitutional challenge. State v. 
£a£Jt£JL# Utah, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1978). 
The statute does not create a new crime; it 
merely enhances punishment: for the latest 
crime in cases where the defendant has been 
previously convicted of and sent to prison 
for two other felony offenses, id.. This is 
consistent with the purpose of Utah's 
statute, which is to "make persistent 
offenders subject to greater sanctions." 
State v, Montaguer Utah, 671 P.2d 187, 190 
(1983) . 
State v, Bailey. 712 P.2d at 286 (emphasis added) . The Utah 
Court of Appeals has held that: 
Under section 76-8-1001, upon proof that a 
person has been twice convicted, sentenced, 
and committed for a felony, one of which is 
at least of the second degree, the person may 
be sentenced as a habitual criminal for a 
period of five years to life. 
State v. Thompson. 77 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 41 (1988) (emphasis 
added)* The trial court did what was statutorily mandateed and 
judicially sound in sentencing the defendant to a separate 
sentence for being found to be an habitual criminal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1953, as amended). 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons and any and all 
reasons set forth at oral argument, if there be any, respondent 
respectfully requests that this Court sustain the convictions of 
the defendant. 
DATED thi i s _ ^ 
7* 
day of 
* 
., 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent to James C. 
Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333 
South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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rv;: :T^I LISA A. IIAXriCLD (12120) and \ \ \ •• \.,;,/.•-",' I.) I 
TIIOflAS McCORNICK (13827) ' '..-•• "* 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS OF TACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS Or LAW 
Case Nos-CCT 83-176;%CR 85-177; 
CR 85-178; CR 85-179; 
CR 85-180 
Honorable David D. Dee 
The above-entitled matter cane on reoularly for hearing 
on a Motion to Dismiss in the Third Judicial Court• The State 
was represented by James Uousely, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, 
the defendant Steven Stillinqs was present and represented by LISA 
A. KAXFIELD and THOMAS McCORMICX of the Legal Defender Association, 
and the Honorable David B. Dee was the Judge prcsidinq. 
Based upon the evidence and argument at hearinq on the 
Motion to Dismiss, the Honorable David B. Dec makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant is a prisoner in the Oreqon Penitentiary. 
2. The defendant is in Utah pursuant to a Weber County 
"request for temporary custody" under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, Utah Code annotated (195J as amended) Section 77-29-5. 
3. While the defendant was in the Oregon Prison Salt Lake 
County filed a "detainer" against him under the Interstate Agree-
ment on Detainers, but never filed a "request for temporary custody". 
4. While the defendant was in the Weber County Jail pursuant 
to Weber County's "request for temporary custody", Salt Lake County 
served him with arrest warrants in the above cases. 
5. Weber County has completed its proceedings against the 
defendant. 
6. Defendant claims that Section 77-29-5, grants a juris-
diction only temporary custody of a prisoner for the purpose of 
trying him on charges underlying its request for temporary custody. 
Since Weber County• s proceedings arc completed and Salt Lake County 
has never requested of Oregon "temporary custody" of the defendant, 
Salt Lake County cannot legally obtain custody of the accused based 
on Weber's request for temporary custody. Salt Lake County must 
allow the prisoner to return to Oregon. 
7. The state maintains that the defendant is legally before 
the court on the Salt Lake County charges even without a "request 
for temporary custody" because the accused was served with arrest 
warrants while present in the state. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 77-29-5 is binding on Salt 
Lake County and by filing a detainer against the defendant the 
County has triggered its provision*;. 
2. Pursuant to Section 77-29-5 Salt Lake County must file 
a detainer andmakca written request of Oregon for "temporary custody" 
of the accused to obtain legal custody of hirn for purpose of standing 
trial on Salt Lake County charges. 
3. Salt Lake County now cannot legally obtain custody 
of the defendant for trial on the above charges by simply serving 
him with warrants while ho is in Utah temporarily pursuant to 
the Weber County request for temporary custody. 
4. Under the Interstate Agrecnent on Detainers the 
defendant should now be returned tp tjS^c State of Oregon. 
DATED this {Q day of tffrt^ +r, 1985. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BY THE COURT 
*>VtfGir'DAVin 13. DUE 
District Court Judge 
^ • ', . ! " ) c 
-j7iV-.V,i,V, 
JM1ES IIOUSELY 
Deputy County Attorney 
LISA A. MAXriCI.D ( # ? 1 2 0 ) and 
THOMAS MCCORMICK (yc?7) 
Attorneys for Defendant:; 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ar.sociaLi.cn 
333 South Second Ear.t: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 1111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THC'DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICAIL DISTRICT 
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
AND TRANSI EN 
Case Nos.^CR fl:i-J7'j) CR SJ-177; 
TK C5-17U; CR 03-179; 
CR 8 5-180 
Based upon the Motion of defendant, the files and records 
in this matter, the argument of counsel and the Findings of Tact 
and Conclusions of Law hereto filed in this matter, 
IT IS ORDERED that all proceedings in the above matters 
bo dismissed and that the defendant be returned to Ucbcr County 
Jail for the purposes of returning him to the custody of the Oregon 
State Penitentiary. / 
DATED this (O day of itf&L, 1985. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HY THE COURT: 
QaZMUz. 
.!T'!<C:E IJAVID H. DEE . 
Third District COurt ' 
JAMES HOUSELY 
Deouty County Attorney 
ADDENDUM B 
T.L. "TED" CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JAMES F. HOUSLEY 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
CKxAlll^. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OT UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S RENEWED 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Criminal No's^ CR 85-176, QR 85-177, 
CR 85-178, CR 85-179, 
CR 85-180 
JUDGE DAVID B. DEE 
The above-entitled cases came on regularly for hearing on 
July 16, 1985, upon defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff 
being represented by JAMES F. HOUSLEY, Deputy County Attorney, and 
the defendant being present and represented by his attorney, THOMAS 
J. McCORMICK, and the Court having received Memoranda of Authorities 
from counsel concerning their respective positions and having heard 
argument of their respective positions and being fully advised in 
the premises hereby enters the following: 
FINDINGS 
1. That the crimes charged in the Informations filed in the 
above numbered cases allegedly occurred between March 10th and March 
30, 1985; 
Findings, Conclusions and Order on Renewed Motion to Dismiss 
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2. That said cases were screened, filed and warrants issued 
between May 21st and June 14, 1984; 
3. That on July 12, 1985, Weber County officials requested, 
under Interstate Agreement on detainers §77-29-5 , Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended - (hereafter IAD), Oregon State Prison officials to 
deliver Defendant to Weber County, Utah for prosecution of him by 
Weber County, Utah, for similar offenses, allegedly committed in that 
county, having previously filed a detainer on the Defendant on June 
14, 1984; 
4. That before July 23, 1984, Salt Lake County officials 
learned that Defendant was in the Oregon State Penitentiary, and 
lodged detainers on him for the charqes arising out of the five inci-
dents occurring in Salt Lake County; 
5. That on August 17, 1984, Oregon State officials caused 
Defendant to be transported to Kcber County for prosecution on the 
Weber County charges and that said Oregon officials left blank, in 
the accompanying documents, the paragraphs provided to authorize Salt 
Lake County to dispose of charges in Salt Lake County; 
6. That on September 19, 1984, Salt Lake County officials 
lodged detainers based upon Salt Lake County warrants against Defendant 
at Weber County Jail; 
7. On January 14, 1985, Salt Lake County officials brought 
Defendant from the Wcbor County Jail to Salt Lake County, without 
having first sought, or received, permission of Oregon officials to 
receive temporary custody of Defendant as provided in Article IV(a) 
Findings, Conclusions and Order on Renewed Motion to Dismiss 
Page 3 
of IAD and without giving Defendant a 30 day opportunity to object 
as provided by that Articlef where he was "arraigned" before the 
Circiut Court in Salt Lake County sitting as a committing magistrate; 
8. That on January 29, 1985, Salt Lake County officials 
brought the Defendant from the Weber County Jail to Salt Lake County, 
where a preliminary hearing on the present charges was held before 
the Circuit Court in Salt Lake County and then returned him to the 
Weber County Jail; 
9. That on February 8, 1985, Salt Lake County officials 
brought the Defendant from the Weber County Jail to Salt Lake County, 
where he was arraigned in Third District Court on the present charges 
and then returned him to the Weber County Jail; 
10. That on February 21, 1985, Defendant moved to dismiss 
Salt Lake County charges for failure to bring Defendant to trial 
within 120 days; 
11. That prior to March 4, 1985, Defendant filed a Memorandum 
articulating his claim that he was entitled to be returned to Oregon, 
asserting that Salt Lake County officials never had jurisdiction of 
Defendant's person because they had not complied with the Article IV(a), 
IAD, requirement that they present a written request for temporary 
custody of Defendant, and that he had not had a 30 day period within 
Findings, Conclusions and Order on Renewed Motion to Dismiss 
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which he might object, and that he was entitled to be returned to 
Oregon State Prison before that procedure could be initiated; 
12. That this Court declined to dismiss these cases but 
Ordered that Defendant be returned to the custody of the Oregon 
State officials pending proceedings under either Article III or Article 
IV, IAD, on the ground that the Defendant could not be tried in Salt 
Lake County, since the Salt Lake County officials had never sought 
nor received authority of the Oregon officials to dispose of the 
charges before his return to Oregon State Penitentiary, under Article 
IV of IAD; 
13. That before May 17, 1985, Oregon State officials 
paroled Defendant to the Weber County hold, and Defendant was then 
transferred to the Utah State Prison (hereafter U.S.P) to begin 
serving sentences on the Weber County charges; 
14. That defendant has never filed prior to his transporta-
tion to U.S.P., any demand for dispositon of the detainers on the Salt 
Lake County charges as required under Article III (a) of the IAD, nor has 
he made any demand for disposition of said detainers under the Inter-
state disposition of detainers provisions §77-29-1, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended since he has been at U.S.P; and 
15. That Salt Lake County officials have never sought 
temporary custody of Defendant under Article IV (a), IAD. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. That before the 120 doy period of time provided under 
Findings, Conclusions and Order on Renewed Motion to Dismiss 
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Article IV(c) , IAD, begins to run the Utah State officials must both 
file detainers and request temporary custody of Defendant, and the 
Defendant must be accorded the 30 day period to object all as provided 
under Article IV(a), IAD; 
2. That before the 180 day period of time provided under 
Article III (a), IAD, begins to run, the Utah State officials must 
file detainers and the Defendant must make a written request for 
final disposition of the charges represented by said detianers as 
provided in said Article III (a); 
3. That before the 120 day period of time provided under 
§77-29-1(1) and (4), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, begins 
to run the Defendant must make a written demand requesting disposition 
of the pending charges as provided in §77-29-1(1); 
4. That the aborted effort to bring Defendant to trial on 
these Salt Lake County charges while Defendant was in the temporary 
custody of the Weber County officials did not constitute a "request 
for temporary custody,H written or otherwise, within the meaning of 
Article IV(a), IAD,; and 
5. That since no such demand or request, written or otherwise, 
has been made, no statutory period of time has begun either under IAD 
or §77-29-1. 
oimcK 
Based upon LIK: foroqoing I indinqs of lact and Conclusions 
of Law and good cause nntvarinq it i.s hereby ordered: 
Findings, Conclusions and Order on Renewed Motion to Dismiss 
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1. It is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant's Renewed 
Motion to Dismiss be# and the same hereby is, denied: and 
2. That trial in cases CR85-176, CR85-177, CR85-178, 
CR85-179 and CR85-180 be stayed pending the outcome of defendant's 
Petition for Permission to Appeal this interlocutory Order. 
DATED this £ U day of J^/Jyf^i , 1985, 
BY THE COURT: 
I? 
Approved as to form this t& day of Vy~
 y 1985. 
Attorney toy Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Served the foregoing Findings, Conclusions and Order on 
Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss upon the Defendant by mailing 
a copy thereof in an envelope, postage prepaid and addressed as 
follows, to his attorney on this day of >^V , 1985. 
Tom McCormick, Esq. 
Legal Defenders Association 
333 South Second East ,** ^> sn 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 >^\ /_ ' Y^ *-&££fi~1 
JAMES F. HOUSLtV 
Deputy County Attorney 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondant, 
vs. 
STEVEN M. STILLINGS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY 
ORDER 
Case No. r ,i 1 ; 1935 
OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL1 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner Stillings is charged in Third District Court, 
Salt Lake Department with several aggravated robberies and other 
crimes in cases numbered CR85-176, CR85-177, CR85-178, CR85-179 
and CR85-180. 
On August 17, 1984, Mr. Stillings, then an inmate at the 
Oregon State Prison, was temporarily transferred to Utah to face 
criminal charges in Weber County. The transfer was effected pursuant 
to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, §77-29-5, Utah 
Code Ann. (1982) (hereinafter cited as Agreement). Prior to the 
completion of proceedings in Weber County, Salt Lake County transferred 
Mr. Stillings to its jurisdiction for prosecution on the charges in 
the above cases. Subsequently, Judge Dee ruled that the transfer 
from Weber to Salt Lake Counties violated Article IV(a) of the Agree-
ment and he suspended further proceedings against Mr. Stillings. 
The judge ordered that officials return Mr. Stillings to Oregon. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by Judge David B. Dee, 
April 10, 1984, at 3 (hereinafter cited as Findings I). 
Soon after his return to Oregon, Mr. Stillings was again 
transferred to Utah to serve a committment at the Utah State Prison. 
The above cases were revived and Mr. Stillings now contends he was rot 
tried by Salt Lake County during his initial presence in Utah within 
the 120 day period also mandated by Article IV(c) of the Agreement. 
He contends that failure entitles him to a dismissal of the present 
cases. Soon after his arrival back in Utah, Mr. Stillings moved 
Judge Dee to dismiss these cases based on the above grounds, and 
the Judgefs denial of the motion is the basis of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to and during August, 1984, Mr. Stillings was incar-
cerated in the Oregon State Prison, Salem, Oregon. Weber County, 
on June 14, 1984, and Salt Lake County, on July 23, 1984, filed 
separate detainers (arrest warrants) on Mr. Stillings with Oregon 
prison officials. Under the Agreement, once a detainer has been filed, 
either the inmate may demand disposition of the charges underlying 
the detainer (Article III) or the receiving State may request 
temporary custody of the inmate for trial on the charges (Article IV). 
Or, the parties can take no action. If the receiving state opts 
to proceed under Article IV, the Agreement requires the inmate be 
tried within 120 days of his arrival in the state. 
On July 12, 1984, pursuant to Article IV(a) of the Agreement, 
Weber County requested temporary custody of Mr. Stillings for pro-
secution. Oregon officials made Mr. Stillings available to Utah 
officials on August 17, 1984, and on that day he was transported to 
the Weber County Jail. From August 17, 1984 until sometime in April, 
.1985, Mr. Stillings remained in Utah, housed either in the Weber or 
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Salt Lake County Jails. The Weber County proceedings lasted until 
February 13, 1985, on which day Mr. Stillings entered guilty pleas 
to reduced charges and was sentenced to three one to fifteen 
indeterminate terms in the Utah State Prison. 
On September 19, 1984, Salt Lake County initiated its 
prosecution of Mr. Stillings by filing arrest warrants with Weber 
County Jail officials. It then transported Mr. Stillings to Salt 
Lake County on January 14, January 29, and February 8, 1985, for his 
initial appearance, preliminary hearing and arraignment, respectively, 
on the above-named cases. At each Salt Lake appearance, Mr. Stillings 
moved to dismiss all Salt Lake County cases on the ground that the 
120 day period within which he must be tried after arriving in Utah, 
dictated in Article IV(c) of the Agreement, had run. After each 
appearance, he was immediately returned to the Weber County Jail. 
When the Weber County cases ended on February 13, 1985, Mr. Stillings 
was relocated in the Salt Lake County Jail. Trial on the Salt Lake 
County cases was set for March 4, 1985 before the Honorable David B. 
Dee. 
On February 21, 1985, Mr. Stillings moved the District Court 
to dismiss the Salt Lake County charges on the grounds that the County 
had not followed proper procedures outlined in the Agreement when it 
went forward with its prosecution and obtained custody of him. He 
argued that under the Agreement he was entitled to have Oregon officials 
review Salt Lake County's desire to prosecute him. He also reiterated 
his argument that the County had failed to bring him to trial within 
the 120 day period mandated by the Agreement, 
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In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Dee, on April 
10, 1985, ruled that Salt Lake County, by transferring Mr. Stillings 
from Weber County to Salt Lake County without first filing a request 
for temporary custody pursuant to Article IV(a) of the Agreement, 
had violated Mr. Stillings right to a review of the transfer by 
Oregon's governor as set out in Article IV(a). In support of his 
ruling, Judge Dee found that by filing a detainer on Mr. Stillings 
while he was incarcerated in Oregon, Salt Lake County had triggered 
application of the Agreement and was bound by its provisons. Findings I 
at 2 • Those provisions require such a review. 
To satisfy the requirements of the Agreement, Judge Dee orderci 
that Petitioner be immediately returned to Oregon. £d. at 3 . The 
Judge reserved ruling on the 120 day issue when and if Mr. Stillings was 
returned to Utah. Oral Ruling at Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, 
March 18, 1985. 
Sometime before May 17, 1985, Mr. Stillings was paroled from 
Oregon State Prison and returned to Utah to begin serving his commit-
tment to the Utah State Prison* Upon motion of the State, trial on 
the Salt Lake County cases was reset for September 3, 1985. 
On June 12, 1985, Mr. Stillings renewed his motion to dismiss 
based on the unargued aspect of his earlier motion that Salt Lake 
County had violated Article IV(c) of the Agreement by not trying him 
on its cases within 120 days of his arrival in Utah. Mr. Stillings 
contended that because he was available to Salt Lake County the entire 
time he was in Utah, as evidenced by the County's success in trans-
porting him to Salt Lake County for court appearances while the Weber 
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County cases were pending, and because Salt Lake County in fact 
proceeded with its prosecution against him, the 120 day period 
should have commenced against Salt Lake County upon his arrival 
in Utah. He argued additionally that the Oregon officials, when 
they were served with Salt Lake County1s detainer, should hav& 
informed Salt Lake County of Weber County's request for tempetary 
custody and authorized Weber County to release Mr. Stillings to 
Salt Lake County officials. Mr. Stillings contended that under the 
Agreement it was his right to have all the detainers filed against 
him by a demanding state lesoived while he was in that state. 
Oregon1s failure to facilitate that resolution denied Mr. Stillings 
the protection accorded him by the Agreement and the only viable 
mechanism to redress that denial is to hold that the time period 
began running against Salt Lake County at the same time it began 
against Weber County - August 17, 1984, the date he arrived in Utah. 
To ensure that both the spirit and the letter of the Agreement is 
carried out courts have held that the receiving state must bear the 
consequences of the improper actions of the sending state. State 
v. Lincoln, 601 p.2d 641 (Colo. 1978). 
Additionally, Mr. Stillings contended that the present case 
closely paralled the facts in United States v. Ford, 436 U.S. 340, 
56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978), and that the Ford decision mandated dismissal 
of the Salt Lake County charges. Once the Agreement is triggered, 
which occurred when Salt Lake County filed its detainer in Oregon, 
then the 120 day period commences when the receiving State initiates 
disposition of its charges. 436 U.S. at 364. Salt Lake County 
-
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initiated disposition of its charges on September 19, 1984, by serving 
its arrest warrants on Petitioner in the Weber County Jail. It 
then continued in January, 1985, what it had started on September 
19, 1984, by bringing Mr. Stillings down to Salt Lake County for 
various court appearances. Salt Lake County thus took advantage of 
the beneficial aspects of the Agreement by attempting to try Mr. 
Stillings while he was in Utah# but is arguing that it should not be 
made to live up to its responsibilities under the Agreement to try 
him within 120 days. This is precisely the situation that the Ford 
case addressed and found to be an unacceptable violation of the 
Agreement. Id. Thus# if the 120 day period did not begin to run 
against Salt Lake County upon Mr. Stillings arrival in Utah on August 
17, 19849 then it must have begun on September 19, 1984, when Salt 
Lake County began its prosecution of Mr. Stillings by arresting him. 
After hearing argument, Judge Dee denied Mr. Stillings motion 
to dismiss. Mr. Stillings contends that that ruling unfairly permitted 
Salt Lake County to make use of the Agreement at the expense of his 
rights contained therein. 
QUESTIONS OF LAW 
Mr. Stillings does not contest the propriety of Judge Dee's 
conclusions of law contained in Findings I. He will assume for 
purposes of this section# that those conclusions are correct. Based 
on that assumption there are only two questions of law presented to 
this court: 
Under the facts of this case is the State of Utah, by and 
through Salt Lake County, bound by the 120 day time period contained 
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in Article IV(c) of the Agreement, and, if so, had that time period 
run by the March 4# 1984 trial setting? 
If the 120 day time is applicable, and had run by the March 
4, 1984 trial setting, should the present cases be dismissed with 
prejudice? 
WHY IMMEDIATE APPEAL SHOULD BE PERMITTED 
The above issues can and should be decided prior to rather 
than after trial on the present charges. They can be decided prior 
to trial because they require no findings of fact or conclusions of 
law which would have to be elicited at trial. The issues in this 
Petition are completely independant of any issues that would be 
raised at trial. They should be decided prior to trial so as to avoid 
lengthy and expensive trials on the substantive charges. The Salt 
Lake County charges involve five separate informations. Each infor-
mation contains allegations of armed robbery, theft, possession of 
a firearm by a restricted person and being a habitual criminal. Mr. 
Stillings will move the trial court to sever the firearm count from 
the others and anticipates that said motion will be granted. State 
v. Saunders, No. 19054 (Filed April 3, 1985). Because the code 
requires a separate trial also on the habitual criminal charge, it 
will take fifteen (15) jury trials to fully and fairly adjudicate 
the charges in the five informations. To present an adequate defense, 
Mr. Stillings also anticipates moving the trial court for costs to 
bring in out-of-state witnesses. Fifteen jury trials with attendant 
costs is an obvious burden on the State of Utah and on the defense, 
particularly on the out-of-state witnesses. It is also a great 
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psychological burden on Mr, Stillings. If there is any hope that 
this Court would reverse Judge Dee's ruling and order the charges 
dismissed, then this should occur prior to the trials rather than 
after. 
APPEAL WILL MATERIALLY ADVANCE TERMINATION OF 
LITIGATION 
If this Court reverses the District Court1s ruling the 
Agreement mandates that the charges be dismissed. That result would 
obviously do more than merely materially advance termination of the 
litigation. If this Court upholds Judge Dee's ruling and these cases 
are reset for trial, the defense will be forced to rethink its plea 
bargaining position due to the fact that these issues constitute 
the main feature of Mr. Stillings1 defense. The defense would be much 
more inclined to accept a reasonable offer and that result is indeed 
a material step toward terminating the cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner requests this Court to review Judge Dee's denial of 
his Motion to Dismiss the charges in the present cases on the ground 
he was not brought to trial within the 120 day period mandated by the 
Agreement. Said request is based on the reasoning contained in United 
States v. Ford, supra, which dictates that Salt Lake County is bound 
by the time period and that said period had run well before a trial 
date was set. The issue was timely raised below and would materially 
advance the termination of litigation by either terminating the cases 
by an order of dismissal or cause the petitioner to seriously re-
evaluate his plea bargaining position. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this // day of October, 198 5, 
X!f6cu^j fc^U(^/ 
THOMAS J. McCORMlCK 
Attorney f9r Petitioner 
Salt Lafce<Legal Defender Assn. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from an Interloctutory Order to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this /( day 
of October, 1985. 
%U*^/A<£<-&<^-<L 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : TO APPEAL FROM AN 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
vs. : 
STEVEN M. STILLINGS, t 
Defendant-Petitioner. : 
Case No. 20480 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, plaintiff-respondent 
in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel, Earl 
F. Dorius, Assistant Attorney General, and hereby files 
this Answer in Opposition to Defendant-Petitioner's Petition 
for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order pursuant 
to Rule 5(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF THE 
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-5 (1953) 
AS AMENDED, THAT WOULD WARRANT 
DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES PRESENTLY 
PENDING AGAINST DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant-petitioner's 
Statement of Facts in his Petition is correct, there has been 
no violation by the prosecution of the Interstate Agreement 
of Detainers (IAD), Utah Code Ann. I 77-29-5 (1953), as 
amended, to justify dismissal of the charges presently 
pending against him. 
He asserts he was incarcerated in an Oregon 
penitentiary when the Weber County Attorney requested 
temporary custody of him under Article IV of the IAD 
(Utah Code Ann. I 77-29-5) to try him on certain charges they 
had pending against him. He was transferred to Weber County 
where he subsequently pled guilty to the charges and was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison on or about February 13, 
1985. He claims no irregularity with these proceedings under 
the IAD. 
However, while he was incarcerated in the Weber 
County Jail# as a pre-trial detainee on the Weber County 
charges, the Salt Lake County Attorneyfs Office commenced 
criminal proceedings which they had pending against him. 
On February 21, 1985, petitioner moved to dismiss those 
charges, relying on two theories which are wholly inconsist-
ent with each other: (1) that Salt Lake officials had not 
properly presented an Article IV, IAD request for temporary 
custody to Oregon officials to secure custody to try him, 
and (2) the 120-day period provided for in Article IV of 
the IAD in which the prosecutors must bring him to trial had 
run. The latter argument would clearly be frivolous if the 
former argument prevailed for if there had not been on Article IV 
request for temporary custody, the 120-day period under 
Article IV would never have commenced. Judge David B. Dee 
agreed with petitionees first theory, granted his motion to 
dismiss, and ordered his return to Oregon to allow Oregon 
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officials the opportunity to first review any request for 
temporary custody which might then be made by Salt Lake 
officials. This ruling clearly comports with the pro-
visions of Article IV of the IAD. 
Thereafter, no request for temporary custody was 
ever made by Salt Lake officials because petitioner was soon 
paroled by Oregon authorities and he was returned to Utah to 
commence serving his prison sentences on the Weber County 
convictions. (Nor did petitioner at any time ever attempt to 
pursue any remedies available to him under Article III of the 
IAD to dispose of the Salt Lake charges). 
Once petitioner was incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison the terms of the IAD no longer applied, and any remedy 
for prompt disposition of any other Utah charges pending 
against him would lie under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1953) 
as amended. Petitioner did not avail himself of this provision. 
Salt Lake County officials soon renewed their prosecu-
tion. Petitioner also renewed his Motion to Dismiss claiming 
the 120-day period under Article IV (c) of the IAD had run. 
His Motion was denied by the trial court, and it is this 
ruling he seeks to appeal. 
Petitioner contends that because he was "available" 
to Salt Lake County during the time he was in Utah being held 
on the Weber County charges, the Article IV (c) 120-day period 
should be deemed to have commenced upon his arrival in Utah. 
This position goes far beyond the terms of the IAD. One re-
ceiving State prosecutor's decision to prosecute charges 
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and obtain temporary custody of a defendant under Article IV 
of the IAD is in no way binding on other prosecutors in the 
receiving State. Although Article IV (b) requires that 
correctional officers in the sending State notify other 
prosecutors in a receiving State (who have also lodged 
detainers against an inmate) that a fellow prosecutor in 
their state has requested temporary custody and that the 
prisoner is being made available to that prosecutor, there 
is no mandate that the other prosecutors also bring that 
inmate to trial during that period. The provision is infor-
mational only in the event the other prosecutors might choose 
to file their own Article IV request for temporary custody, 
and that was not done in this case. The provision in Article 
IV (b) does not create a right of disposition of charges for 
a prisoner. Article IV is the prosecutorfs half of the IAD. 
Any right the petitioner might have to have the charges 
disposed of lies within Article III of the IAD, and nothing 
would have precluded petitioner from filing an Article III 
request for disposition of the Salt Lake charges during that 
period. He did not do so and instead chose to do the opposite 
by moving to dismiss the Salt Lake charges on the ground that 
no proper Article IV request had been made by the Salt Lake 
prosecutor. He is thus not in a position to claim a denial 
of any right he may have had to have the Salt Lake charges 
brought to trial. Whether Oregon officials did or did not 
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notify other Utah officials of Petitionees availability for 
prosecution under Article IV (b) accordingly should not serve 
as a basis for dismissal of the Salt Lake charges. 
Petitioner's latest claim that the 120 days should 
be deemed to have run because "he was available to Salt Lake 
County the entire time he was in Utah" also flies in the face 
of his earlier argument that he was not available for prosecu-
tion and should have been returned to Oregon because an 
Article IV request had not been made by Salt Lake authorities. 
He prevailed on this claim and should be bound by that argu-
ment. He should be precluded from having it both ways. 
Finally, petitioner claims United States v. Mauro# 
436 U.S. 340 (1978)1, mandates dismissal of the Salt Lake 
charges. He claims that once the application of the IAD 
is triggered (when Salt Lake County filed its detainer with 
Oregon Correctional authorities), then the 120-day period 
commences when the "receiving State" initiates disposition 
of its charges. He overreads both the IAD and Mauro. 
The Mauro court (in Mr. Ford's case) merely held 
that the United States is a party to the IAD, and that when 
the federal government demands that a State correctional 
official make a State prisoner available for prosecution and 
obtains custody by way of a writ of habeas corpus aj3 prosequendum, 
1 Petitioner miscites the case as "United States v. Ford" 
in his petition. Mr. Ford's case was joined with Mr. Flauro's 
on appeal. 
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it has effectually activated Article IV of the IAD and it must 
bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days as required by 
Article IV (c). The writ was viewed as tantamount to a "written 
request for temporary custody" within the meaning of Article 
IV (a). Mr. Ford, unlike petitioner, had also made repeated 
requests for a speedy trial. In petitionees case, no 
semblance of any request for temporary custody was ever made 
by Salt Lake officials on Oregon officials. Thus, Article IV 
was never triggered at all. 
Based upon the foregoing, petitioner's Petition for 
interlocutory appellate review should be denied. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Answer in Opposition to Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, postage 
prepaid, to Thomas J. McCormick, attorney for petitioner, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333 South Second East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ^fa/ day of October, 1985. 
ADDENDUM E 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
October 2S. 198S 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
David L. Wilkinson. A.G. 
Governmental Affairs Division 
State of Utah. 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
v. 
Steven M. Stillings. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
n.rr ?61985 
OFFICE OF 
AHORNEY GENERAL 
THIS DAY. Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal is denied. 
Geoffrey J. Butler. Cleric 
